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Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale
JOHN L. CARROLL*
INTRODUCTION
"There has been widespread criticism of the abuse of discovery."'
That statement comes not from a recent edition of the Defense
Research Institute newsletter but from the Advisory Committee notes
to the 1980 amendment that gave us the Rule 26(f) conference.' Dis-
covery abuse and the increase in the cost of litigation that flows from
such abuse has been a constant theme emerging from analysis of the
civil justice system. As Congress noted when it passed the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990,1
discovery abuse is a principal cause of high litigation transaction costs.
Indeed, in far too many cases, economics-and not the merits-govern
discovery decisions. Litigants of moderate means are often deterred
through discovery from vindicating claims or defenses, and the litiga-
tion process all too often becomes a war of attrition for all parties.4
That theme continued to be explored by researchers during the mid-
1990s. As one contemporary study of the American civil justice sys-
tem observed, "[c]ases in federal courts take too long and cost litigants
too much. Consequently, proponents of reform argue, some litigants
are denied access to justice and many litigants incur inappropriate bur-
dens when they turn to the courts for assistance in resolving
disputes."5
The topic is as hot now as it has ever been. In its controversial
decision reframing the notice pleading standard, the United States
Supreme Court, relying on a 1989 article by Judge Frank Easterbrook,
* Judge Carroll (B.A., Tufts University; J.D., Cumberland School of Law at Sam-
ford University; LL.M., Harvard College) is Dean and Ethel P. Malugen Professor of
Law at Samford University's Cumberland School of Law where he teaches evidence,
mediation, trial advocacy, and a specialized course in the discovery of electronically
stored information. He is a former member of the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and former Chair of its discovery
subcommittee.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note.
2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
4. S. REP No. 101-416, at 6823 (1.990).
5. James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial
Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 17 (1997).
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lamented discovery abuse and opined that "the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic
cases before reaching those proceedings."' The Court's concerns were
echoed in a much-publicized report by the American College of Trial
Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of the Legal System
released in March of 2009.' The project that generated the report "was
conceived as an outgrowth of increasing concerns that problems in the
civil justice system, especially those relating to discovery, have resulted
in unacceptable delays and prohibitive expense."8 The report calls for
reforms in several areas, including discovery.9
E-discovery is often labeled as the discovery problem child. A
recent study done by the American Bar Association Section found that
82% of the lawyers surveyed (including 61% of the plaintiffs' lawyers
surveyed) agreed discovery is too expensive. 10 Fifty-one percent
believed discovery is commonly abused," and 66% believed that e-
discovery in particular is abused.12 As the report's detailed findings
note, although there is disagreement between the plaintiff and defense
bars over the problems created by e-discovery, a majority of both
agreed that e-discovery increases the cost of litigation. 3
To be sure, there are voices expressing another side to the abuse
claim. Not everyone believes the system is so broken that radical
reforms are necessary. For example, a preliminary report by the Fed-
eral Judiciary Center released in October of 2009 surveying lawyers in
closed cases suggests that cries of abuse and skyrocketing cost are
overblown.' 4 The executive summary states that
[mlore than 60% of the respondents (and two out of three defendant's
attorneys) reported that the disclosure and discovery in the closed
6. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (citing Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)). It is important to note
that Judge Easterbrook's article was published prior to the amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
7. FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM (2009) [hereinafter ACTL REPORT].
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id. at 2-4, 25.
10. LITIGATION SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRAC-
TICE: DETAILED REPORT 49, 93, 138 (2009) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY].
11. Id. at 49.
12. Id. at 93.
13. Id. at 90.
14. See EMERY G. LEE & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009).
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cases generated the "right amount" of information. More than half
reported that the costs of discovery were the "right amount" in propor-
tion to their clients' stakes in the closed cases.'
5
While it does not appear that any empirical argument exists showing
the abuse of discovery to be rampant, the complaints of members of
the legal profession16-not to mention the responses of the Advisory
Committee17-certainly suggest that many cases could benefit from a
more focused approach to discovery.' 8 Requiring discovery to be con-
ducted in a focused manner benefits both plaintiffs and defendants by
reducing the cost and duration of litigation. In particular, application
of the "proportionality" analysis embodied in Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure' 9 may provide just the sort of focus needed to
curb modern discovery abuses-but this potentially valuable tool must
be used with caution.
I. THE PROPORTIONALITY RULES
The tools for proportionality analysis are not new. They first
appeared in the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that came into effect in 1983.20 Proportionality analysis flows from
the texts of two specific provisions: Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(g). The
court's duty to impose that analysis is found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), 2 '
which requires the court to "limit the frequency or extent of discovery"
if it determines that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
15. Id. at 2.
16. E.g., ABA SURVEY, supra note 10, at 49, 93. In any event, the purpose of this
Article is not to take sides in the debate over how much abuse exists or does not exist
in our civil justice system, but rather, to assess the merits and potential pitfalls of the
Rule 26 proportionality analysis.
17. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (noting that "the spirit of the
rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons
rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of discovery or
unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses," and that this "results in
excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are disproportionate to the
nature of the case, the amount involved, or the issues or values at stake").
18. The author's own thirty-five years of experience in the judicial system tend to
confirm this phenomenon.
19. See infra Part I.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
21. The proportionality rule has been numbered slightly differently in years past.
It began as Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) in the 1983 amendments and in the 1993 amendments
as Rule 26(b)(2)(iii). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
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resolving the issues. '22 Meanwhile, the duty of lawyers to request pro-
portional discovery and to respond to a proportional discovery request
is found in the provisions of Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii), which states that by
signing a disclosure, a discovery request, response, or objection, a law-
yer certifies that "to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry," the document is "neither
unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in contro-
versy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action. ' 23 The
following sections address each of these rules in more detail.
A. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)
The federal civil justice system permits very liberal discovery, and
case law makes clear that the concept of relevancy under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is to be broadly construed.24 In 1983, those
rules were amended to provide judges with a tool to limit this broad
discovery in appropriate cases.25 That tool is the proportionality rule
now appearing as Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The reasons behind the crea-
tion of the rule were set out in unmistakable terms in the Advisory
Committee's notes to the 1983 amendments:
Rule 26(b)(1) has been amended to add a sentence to deal with the
problems of over-discovery. The objective is to guard against redundant
or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the
amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise
proper subjects for inquiry. The new sentence was added to encourage
judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery
overuse.
26
As one of the earliest court opinions construing the amendment
noted, "[t]he amendment to the rule seeks to strike a balance with the
general rule that allows for liberal discovery of all relevant but not priv-
ileged material. '27 Courts have consistently used this rule and its suc-
cessors to limit discovery.28
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).
24. E.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. English v. Cowell, 117 F.R.D. 132, 134-35 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
28. See, e.g., Takacs v. Union County, No. 08-711, 2009 WL 3048471 (D.NJ. Sept.
23, 2009) (unpublished slip op.) (limiting discovery of information about pretrial
detainees); Hughes v. CUNA Mut. Group, 257 F.R.D. 176 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (limiting
discovery of information about other policyholders whose claims were denied); Pub.
Serv. Enter. Group Inc. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 130 F.R.D. 543 (D.NJ. 1990) (limit-
458 [Vol. 32:455
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol32/iss3/2
PROPORTIONALITY IN DISCOVERY
While the amendment clearly empowers a court to limit discovery
to that which is proportionate, the Advisory Committee's notes caution
that proportionality analysis requires consideration of far more than
the dollars and cents a case is worth or that discovery will cost:
[T]he rule recognizes that many cases in the public policy spheres,
such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may
have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved. The court
must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent
the use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a
party, whether financially weak or affluent.29
The best description of the process for analyzing proportionality
in discovery comes from an opinion by the iconic United States Magis-
trate Judge Wayne Brazil, one of the country's leading experts in fed-
eral practice and procedure. The opinion was written not long after
the concept of proportionality was injected into the rules. 30 The rele-
vant quote is lengthy but very informative and consequently is set out
in full:
[The 19831 amendments formally interred any argument that discov-
ery should be a free form exercise conducted in a free for all spirit.
Discovery is not now and never was free. Discovery is expensive. The
drafters of the 1983 amendments to sections (b) and (g) of Rule 26
formally recognized that fact by superimposing the concept of propor-
tionality on all behavior in the discovery arena. It is no longer suffi-
cient, as a precondition for conducting discovery, to show that the
information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." After satisfying this threshold require-
ment counsel also must make a common sense determination, taking
into account all the circumstances, that the information sought is of
sufficient potential significance to justify the burden the discovery
probe would impose, that the discovery tool selected is the most effica-
cious of the means that might be used to acquire the desired informa-
tion (taking into account cost effectiveness and the nature of the
information being sought), and that the timing of the probe is sensible,
i.e., that there is no other juncture in the pretrial period when there
would be a clearly happier balance between the benefit derived from
and the burdens imposed by the particular discovery effort.31
ing discovery of power outages and mismanagement at a power plant other than the
one at issue in the lawsuit); Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121
(M.D.N.C. 1989) (limiting discovery of other lawsuits against an insurer).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(iii) advisory committee's note.
30. Judge Brazil's opinion in In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation, 108
F.R.D. 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985), was issued two years after adoption of the amendments
described supra in the text accompanying notes 25-27.
31. In re Convergent, 108 F.R.D. at 331.
2010] 459
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Judge Brazil's words ring as true today as they did almost twenty years
ago when he wrote them.
B. Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii)
As noted above, the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(g),
which spells out the lawyer's obligation relating to proportional dis-
covery, first appeared in the 1983 amendments to the federal rules.
Subsection (g) was added, according to the Advisory Committee's
notes, to provide "a deterrent to both excessive discovery and evasion
by imposing a certification requirement that obliges each attorney to
stop and think about the legitimacy of a discovery request, a response
thereto, or an objection. '32 The purpose of the rule was not to limit
discovery but to impose on lawyers engaged in the discovery process
the duty of making a reasonable inquiry before signing their name to a
discovery document.33 The obligations imposed under Rule 26(g)
flow both ways.34 They plainly require, under pain of sanctions, that
requesting parties seek only proportional discovery. Moreover, they
impose an equal obligation (also under pain of sanctions) on produc-
ing parties to produce proportional discovery without objection and
delay.36
II. THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
There is no doubt that proportionality can be a valuable tool in
controlling the cost of litigation. Its greatest value is creating a mind-
set in the court and litigants that discovery needs to be focused on the
real issues in the case and that cost is a consideration. If courts and
litigants approach discovery with the mindset of proportionality, there
is the potential for real savings in both dollars and time to resolution.
The proportionality concept also guides the court to use common
sense techniques for managing discovery, like phased discovery or
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note.
33. See id.
34. The existence of this two-way street was one of the emphases in a recent opin-
ion by United States Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm, who in discussing the modern
contours of Rule 2 9 (g) explained that it "aspires to eliminate one of the most prevalent
of all discovery abuses: knee jerk discovery requests served without consideration of
cost or burden to the responding party." Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253
F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008). The rule was designed to "bring an end to the equally
abusive practice of objecting to discovery requests reflexively-but not reflectively-
and without a factual basis." Id.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii), 26(g)(3).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii), 26 (g)( 3 ).
[Vol. 32:455
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sequenced discovery. Those techniques will be particularly helpful in
managing cases where the discovery of large volumes of electronically
stored information is likely to occur. Properly used, the proportional-
ity tools available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can go a
long way toward reaching the long sought-after goal of Rule 1: securing
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."37 Proportionality is not, however, the answer to all woes.
The operative concept in the foregoing praise of proportionality is
proper use. Used improperly, the proportionality analysis can be at
best a meaningless exercise and at worst a tool to deny civil litigants
access to information to which they are entitled. Thus, while propor-
tionality is a valuable tool, it is not a talisman.
A. Early Discussion of Proportionality Is Important
As a threshold matter, proportionality only works if the interven-
tion is early and by a judge willing to perform the managerial role
contemplated by the discovery rules. The amendments designed to
facilitate the discovery of electronically stored information, which
became effective on December 1, 2006, provide an important step in
the right direction by requiring the parties to state their views and pro-
posals on "any issues about disclosures or discovery of electronically
stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be
produced. '3  Also helpful is the part of the rule predating the 2006
amendments that requires the parties to discuss phased or limited
discovery.39
There is nothing in the rules, however, that specifically requires
proportionality to be the subject of an early discussion. History sug-
gests that courts do not discuss proportionality in the early stages of a
case. 40 Unfortunately, while the rules specifically encourage a propor-
tionality analysis, there is no requirement that the parties and court
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(2).
40. See, e.g., State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. County of Camden, No. 08-5128, 2009 WL
4895245, at *4 (D.NJ. Dec. 10, 2009) (allowing discovery "beyond answers to inter-
rogatories to flush out [certain] issues"); Fattahi v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, &
Firearms, 186 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that because of the early
stage of litigation, judgment on defendant's motion to dismiss should be deferred to
allow for more discovery); Moss v. W & A Cleaners, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185 (M.D.
Ala. 2000) (explaining that "[a]t this early stage of the proceedings .... it would be
more appropriate to enter a scheduling order and allow the [plarties to conduct
discovery").
20101
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discuss proportionality early in the case when that discussion would
be most beneficial.
4 1
A solution to this difficulty is simple: require either by protocol or
local rule that there be a discussion of proportionality before the dis-
covery plan required by Rule 26(f) is submitted to the court. Rule
26(f)(3)(B) already requires the parties to state their views and propos-
als on phasing discovery, and the proportionality discussion would be
a natural outgrowth of that mandate.42
Some courts are moving in this direction. The District Court of
Maryland, for example, in its Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Elec-
tronically Stored Information, requires the parties to discuss as part of
the Rule 26(f) process "[s]pecific facts related to the costs and burdens
of preservation and retrieval and use of ESI," "[c]ost sharing for the
preservation, retrieval and/or production of ESI," and "the amount of
pre-production review that is reasonable for the Producing Party to
undertake in light of the considerations set forth in [Rule]
26(b)(2)(C). ' 43 In comparison, the proposed Standing Order Relating
to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information designed for use
in the Seventh Circuit contains more specific reference to proportional-
ity: "The proportionality standard set forth in [Rule] 26(b)(2)(C)
should be applied in each case when formulating a discovery plan. To
further the application of the proportionality standard in discovery,
requests for production of ESI and related responses should be reason-
ably targeted, clear and as specific as practicable."44 This proposed
standing order would also require parties to discuss "the potential for
conducting discovery in phases or stages as a method for reducing
costs and burdens. 45
Both the District of Maryland protocol and the proposed standing
order of the Seventh Circuit pilot project do what is necessary: they
force counsel to focus at an early stage on proportionality. The above
references to the language of these documents is not, however, an
endorsement of the complexity of the overall procedure set out in
them. My suggestion is more simple: the court should simply require
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(B).
43. United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Suggested Protocol
for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information 21-22 (n.d.), available at http://
www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/esiprotocol.pdf.
44. Seventh Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program, Statement of Purpose and
Preparation of Principles 18 (2009), available at http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/state
ment%20-%20phase%20one.pdf.
45. Id.
[Vol. 32:455
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the parties, in the planning stages of discovery, to discuss the burdens
and expenses of the proposed discovery and the likely benefit.
Of course, requiring the parties to discuss proportionality is sim-
ply a step in the right direction. The discussion accomplishes nothing
if the court is not willing to be engaged in the proportionality discus-
sion. The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
became effective on December 1, 1983 marked the entry of the concept
of managerial judging into the federal rules. The amended rule made
case management an express goal, encouraging early intervention and
lauding its benefits. 4 6 That early intervention theme then continued in
the 2006 amendments designed to facilitate the discovery of electroni-
cally stored information. 47 The respondents to a recently-released
study by the American Bar Association confirmed the wisdom of the
rules drafters in encouraging early intervention: 73% of all the respon-
dents indicated that they believe that when a judicial officer gets
involved early and stays involved, the results are more satisfactory to
their clients.48
Unfortunately, it does not appear that early intervention by
judges is a prevalent practice. It also appears even when judges inter-
vene early that the proportionality tool is infrequently used. In the
ABA's recent survey, 76% of respondents believed judges do not
invoke protections against excessive discovery on their own,49 and
nearly 60% believed that judges do not enforce those mechanisms to
limit discovery. 0 These results are echoed in the survey of lawyers
done by the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for
Advancement of the American Legal System, which contends that
[j]udges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in
designing the scope of discovery and the direction and timing of the
case all the way to trial. Where abuses occur, judges are perceived not
to enforce the rules effectively. According to one Fellow, 'Judges need
to actively manage each case from the outset to contain costs; nothing
else will work."51
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (discussing case management and
early intervention by a judge for purposes of assuming judicial control).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv); 26(f)(3)(C)-(D).
48. ABA SURVEY, supra note 10, at 113.
49. Id. at 64.
50. Id. at 65.
51. ACTL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
2010] 463
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Thus, it appears that proportionality, which most suggest is a valuable
tool for managing discovery, may be very underutilized. 52
B. The Proportionality Tools Must Be Carefully Used
A more fundamental problem with proportionality needs to be
discussed: the danger that monetary value of a case, alone, will control
the proportionality analysis, impeding the discovery efforts of parties
with limited resources and failing to acknowledge the non-pecuniary
importance of public policy-related suits, such as those involving alle-
gations of discrimination. I will explain.
There really are two components to the proportionality analysis
and the proportionality rule. The first component is what I will
describe as a global proportionality analysis that focuses on the
amount in controversy and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation. That analysis is heavily value-laden and presents the oppor-
tunity for the most uncertainty. The second component is specific pro-
portionality that focuses on the needs of the case and the importance
of the discovery at issue in resolving the case. Specific proportionality
is much like materiality analysis under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which limits the admission of facts to those that are "of
consequence to a determination of the action."53 It is this specific pro-
portionality analysis that is most valuable, because it provides an
appropriate standard for controlling discovery.
The danger mentioned above is revealed by a recent detailed anal-
ysis of proportionality appearing in the opinion of Judge Paul Grimm
in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co. 54 This case was a collective
action for declaratory and monetary relief under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.55 At a discovery hearing, the court cautioned counsel about
the boilerplate objections filed by the defendants as well as the breadth
of the plaintiff's discovery requests, which the court noted were possi-
bly "excessively broad and costly. '56 The court then engaged in an
extensive analysis of Rules 26(g) and 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) and an
assessment of the value of those rules in controlling the costs of discov-
ery.57 The court ended its opinion with an interesting practical
52. But see Debra Lyn Bassett, Reasonableness in E-Discovery, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV.
435, 452 (2010) (observing that the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) good cause standard is com-
monly conflated with the proportionality test of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)).
53. FED. R. EVID. 401.
54. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008).
55. Id. at 355.
56. Id. at 356.
57. Id. at 357-63.
[Vol. 32:455
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approach to proportionality. It ordered the parties to meet and confer
to attempt "to identify a foreseeable range of damages from zero if the
Plaintiffs do not prevail, to the largest award they could likely prove if
they succeed."58 The court also asked plaintiffs' counsel to estimate
their attorney fees. 59 It then noted,
While admittedly a rough estimate, this range is useful for determining
what the "amount in controversy" is in the case, and what is "at stake"
for purposes of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s proportionality analysis. The goal
is to attempt to quantify a workable "discovery budget" that is propor-
tional to what is at issue in the case.60
The notion of a "discovery budget" is an interesting concept, but a
limited one, because it calls for a global proportionality analysis rather
than a specific one. Where what is at stake is solely money and the
maximum and minimum amounts can be easily quantified, pursuit of
a discovery budget and limiting discovery based on that budget may
well make sense and be appropriate. In a contract action, for example,
where the maximum damages are $100,000, that figure may well
represent what is "at stake" in the litigation. But such monetizing of
what is "at stake" is not so easy where the issue is not breach of con-
tract but constitutional or statutory civil rights.
Take, for example, a case involving the discharge of an employee
for reasons of race or gender. If we decide that what is "at stake" in the
litigation is strictly controlled by the maximum possible recovery, then
essentially we are saying discovery in a case where the plaintiff is a low
ranking hourly employee should be more restrictive than in a case
where the victim of discrimination is a high level manager because the
dollar amount of damages will be less, since the low-level employee
earns much less.
In addition, consider cases where no damages are sought but the
public value of the case is high, such as a case against a private
employer for maintaining a racially harassing work environment or
against a city police force for racial profiling. The use of a "discovery
budget" tool in those sorts of cases would be counterproductive. This
is not to say that the concept of proportionality goes out the window.
The point, rather, is that it will be difficult to monetize the case and
thus difficult to discuss what is "at stake" in monetary terms. 61
58. Id. at 364.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. This concern was expressed by the Rules Committee in the advisory notes to
the original proportionality rules that were promulgated in 1983.
2010] 465
11
Carroll: Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010
CAMPBELL LAW REviEw
Engaging in a global proportionality analysis that simply asks,
"What is this case worth monetarily?" will certainly be helpful in a
limited number of cases. But engaging in a specific proportionality
analysis that asks, "Is this particular approach to discovery worth the
cost given the information which it will produce?" is a much more
helpful inquiry that focuses the parties on the most efficient way to
manage discovery in a particular case. The focus on the value of dis-
covery in producing useful information is a better approach than try-
ing to limit discovery based on the value of the case.
CONCLUSION
The proportionality provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure can be valuable tools in managing discovery. Their use can bring
an appropriate focus to discovery matters, enabling the court and the
parties to make discovery more narrowly structured and more cost
efficient. The best and highest use of proportionality, however, is the
specific proportionality analysis, which focuses on the burden or
expense of discovery as it relates to the needs of the case and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. This approach
allows a discussion of the costs of particular discovery, the likely infor-
mation that the discovery will produce, and the value of that informa-
tion to the critical issues in litigation. Less helpful is the global
proportionality analysis that focuses on the amount in controversy and
the importance of the issues at stake in the case.
466 [Vol. 32:455
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